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Post-socialist societies are simultaneously facing at least three types of transformation, 
causing complex structural changes:  
1. From totalitarian to democratic society, from the planned to market based 
economy and/or from supply to demand driven economy 
2.  Developmental: from an industrial to post-industrial (service) economy and 
society 
3.  Transformation from an isolated to an integrated position in the world economy, 
which is itself transformed from an international to global type.  
 
All of these types of transformation  have affected cities, which themselves are spatial 
projections of society (Lefebvre 1968: 64).  
 
In spite of their potential analytical importance, post-socialist cities are still a neglected 
research subject. The main aim of this paper is to underline unique aspects of post-
socialist cities in terms of their institutional and actionable capacity for transformation 
into capitalist, post-industrial cities that are integrated within global urban networks. 
First, the paper briefly reviews the basic approaches to the study of cities in urban 
sociology, considering the ways in which they capture the complex transformation of 
post-socialist cities. Second, in view of that, important aspects of post-socialist city 
transformation are analysed. Third, after pointing out divergences and/or convergences 
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between post-socialist cities within Europe, the paper investigates ex-Yugoslav cities as a 
sub-type of post-socialist cities. Finally, paper concludes that historic and path-
dependency approach is most appropriate for researching the transformational capacities 
of post-socialist cities.  
 
Basic analytical approaches to cities   
 
Depending on the way in which the physical and social structures of the city in general, 
and of the socialist city (urbanisation patterns) in particular, are understood, there are 
several  analytical approaches to a post-socialist city. 
 
The ecological approach emphasizes  industrialisation as an independent variable of the  
urbanisation process, while socio-political organisation represents an intervening variable 
that may cause some deviations from optimal spatial concentration of the population 
generated by economic growth, in general, and industrialisation, in particular, as 
manifested in the West (Szelenyi 1996: 289). Szelenyi takes the ecological explanation as 
significantly different from the historical one, which is more sensitive to institutional 
specificities of urban development and based on an assumption that societies with 
different socio-economic orders produce qualitatively different urban conditions. 
 
Although Enyedi follows the basic principles of the ecological approach his interpretation 
of  socialist urbanisation in Europe is more sociological. Thus, he considers it as a belated 
and distorted pattern of universal urban development that prolonged rural-urban 
dichotomy, hindered the development of the urban middle class and promoted 
proletarianization (Enyedi 1998: 11). Szelenyi argues that during the extensive 
industrialisation of the socialist era, East European countries became “under-urbanised”. 
This term refers to the lag of growth in urban population behind the growth of industrial 
jobs, and a lack of coordination between infrastructure development and industrial 
growth, unlike the Western experience. Nevertheless, Szelenyi did not pursue the 
ecological interpretation, which assumes that the urbanisation pattern, as exemplified in 
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the West, will eventually be replicated in post-socialist countries (Szelenyi 1996: 294-
295).  
 
Two theoretical positions developed in urban sociology within the historical approach:  
neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian (Szelenyi 1996). For neo-Marxists, the socialist city was 
identified by its mode of production that contrasted with that of the capitalist city, and 
which in turn determined qualitatively different social and spatial structures. The neo-
Weberian approach emphasized various systems of social organisation. Thus, Szelenyi 
(1983) focused on the dominant type of integrative mechanisms (market versus state 
re/distribution), corresponding power relations and resulting inequalities.  
 
In spite of their differences in explaining the socialist city, both theories presume that   
socialist structures are in many ways inappropriate for the socialist city’s transformation 
towards a developed capitalist model. Marxists consider the urban policy of the socialist 
city from the perspective of conflict of interests polarised between work and capital, 
while the neo-Weberian approach takes state intervention as a rational instrumental action 
that regulates potential conflict of interests between different/pluralized social groups 
(not only work vs. capital). Thus, according to the Marxists, urban policy reproduces 
dominant power relations and generates social polarisation through spatial dimensions,  
primarily by the means of collective consumption – social services. For the neo-
Weberians, urban policy not only reproduces the existing class divisions in the production 
sphere but also affects its modification within the sphere of consumption (of housing, 
urban services, etc). The effects of urban/housing policy measures are seen in the context 
of civil versus class status, in which the former overcomes the limitation of the latter by 
allowing individuals/social groups to make choices beyond the limits of their class 
identity. Apart from connecting urban policy matters with civil rights’ issues, the neo-
Weberians instigate a theoretical discussion about the effects of urban/housing policy 
measures  on social classes’ identity formation, as this is no longer defined primarily by 
occupational status but also by consumption strategies, lifestyle options, etc. (Saunders 
1990; Lash 1990). 
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Most urban sociologists dealing with post-socialist city development accept the under-
urbanisation thesis and approach it from a neo-Weberian perspective (Szelenyi 1996; 
Tosics 1997, 2003; Bodnar, 2001). Following this perspective, Tosics assumes that by 
applying consciously interventionist measures and by influencing certain elements of the 
socio-economic system, the process of urban development may be modified and certain 
steps of the global urbanisation model might be simply avoided (Tosics 1997: 757). 
 
The restructuring of the welfare state in the West and the collapse of the socialist state in 
Eastern Europe gave credence to theories that overcome the clear distinctions between 
neo-Marxists and neo-Weberians, such as the regulation theory (Hall and Hubbard 1998), 
and Bourdie’s theory of habitus (Bourdie 1990).  
 
The urban regime concept  is based mainly on the regulation theory that differentiates 
various regimes of capital and respective macroeconomic relations according to the role 
of the state in facilitating the transition of the economy in the interest of capital 
accumulation, while absorbing the social costs of this transition. Urban regime is also 
defined as informal but relatively stable cooperation between public and private actors 
who have the capability to govern the city. The regulation theory also introduces the 
concept of the entrepreneurial city, which  presupposes  a specific proactive local 
government strategy to secure competitive advantages within an increasingly 
unpredictable and global economy (Franz 2000: 136). Such a framework raises questions 
about the unique aspects of post-socialist urban regimes, such as the socialist legacy of 
the concentration of power, no public-private partnership and underdeveloped civil rights 
and civil society actors.  
 
The same holds true for the implementation of Bourdie's theory in  post-socialist city 
research, because it focuses on the power structures within the arena of urban policy. The 
main actors within this arena are divided into those providing and those receiving the 
services. Strategies of both groups are generated through specific “habitus” (Bourdieu 
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1990), which refers to the interplay between structural limitations and possible strategic 
inventions. Only actors with sufficient resources will be successful considering the 
effects of (urban) social policy (Peillon 1998: 220-221). In this context, even assuming 
properly defined urban and housing rights in post-socialist cities, the relevant question 
might be: are these rights sufficient for social groups that are lacking other resources (not 
only economic but also cultural and social capital)?  
 
Relying on Bourdieu’s analysis of different forms of capital and their reproduction, 
particular attention is paid to informal practices existing in post-socialist cities, which 
have been inherited from socialism. During the post-socialist period these practices 
become strategies aimed at reducing risks from unleashed market forces. Self-built, 
mostly illegal housing construction, and illegal use of public spaces for informal trade 
activities (open area markets - OAMs) are the strategies most frequently analysed. They 
are based on  investments in social relations (social capital), which supplement or 
substitute for the lack of financial capital (Sik and Wallace 1999). 
 
The path dependency approach emerged in urban sociology from the neo-institutional 
theory. Institutions are seen as rules defining the games between actors in different 
arenas. In urban /housing policy, they mainly refer to the political and market arenas. In 
this context, historical development has been perceived as an ongoing chain of  
institutional (and discursive) design, while its possibilities and/or options of innovation 
are limited by the institutional legacies of the past (Bengtsson 1995; Nielsen et al, 1995). 
This approach has been particularly fruitful in researching differences between capitalist 
welfare states and respective urban/housing policies (comprehensive versus residual 
policy types). Similarly, Enyedi (1992: 879) found that urban processes in regions such as 
the Balkans were different to those in the West due to supposedly immutable traditions of 
egalitarian peasant societies.  In thinking about the socialist and post-socialist city, path 
dependency is often presented as a general theoretical perspective of institutional 
sluggishness that specifies factors that have blocked the road towards some otherwise 
plausible historical development. Nevertheless, by combining elements of structural and 
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strategic approaches, the path dependency framework bridges the simplicities of 
determinism versus voluntarism.  
 
The path dependency approach has been  broadly accepted in the research of the post-
socialist city because it allows different theoretical positions or even no explicit 
theoretical approach. It emphasizes that decomposition of state socialist economies and 
political systems has created a conjuncture in which further strategic choices of city 
development could be made. Therefore, complex institutional legacies still influence the 
expectations and patterns of conduct of different social groups. This is particularly 
significant in relation to the development of flexible social patterns and networks 
necessary to compensate for the rigidities of socialist urban and housing systems 
(informal practices, self-building strategies, illegal construction, etc). Thus, from the path 
dependency perspective, the uniform direction and speed of transformation have been 
questioned, while the need to ground city transformation processes in the discourses and 
strategies of the key actors has gained  importance (Pickvance 2002: 196-7). How post-
socialist cities will develop, for example, following the model of advanced capitalist 
countries, peripheral capitalist countries of the Third World, or developing a new hybrid 
form, is unknown at the present time (Harloe 1996: 6). Due to the complexity of the  city 
as a system  it would be impossible for post-socialist cities to copy urban models from the 
West because they lack not only the institutional but the cultural infrastructure on which 
such  cities rely. Consequently, the actual effects of adopting such a model might be quite 
different from those intended.  
 
The world-system analytical framework might be approached from different theoretical 
perspectives. Generally, it demonstrates that, in the context of contemporary 
globalisation, it is the constellation of particular production and consumption sites 
accommodated in cities that gives  them a coordinating and powerful position within the 
world hierarchy of cities. Due to different development characteristics of cities, the 
world’s centres and peripheries have not disappeared but multiplied in the new global 
urban system (Sassen 2000: 149; Knox 1995). From the perspective of the world-system 
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approach, Marxist urban sociologists interpreted the problems of Third World 
urbanisation as an expression of dependent capitalist development (Castells 1975).  
The world-system approach considers socialist urbanisation as yet another type of 
dependent urbanisation (Tosics 2003; Bodnar 2001). Consequently, the inherited 
backwardness and decay of post-socialist cities puts them on the periphery of  the global 
urban hierarchy, thus less attractive to big multinational corporations. Accordingly, these 
cities are relegated to a  semi-peripheral position within this hierarchy.  
 
 
Main aspects of post-socialist city transformation 
 
The following analysis is focused on the relevant aspects of post-socialist city 
transformation in line with the analytical and theoretical approaches outlined above. 
Although  interrelated, these issues are divided into four thematic groups, with the aim of  
presenting their specific analytical assumptions.  
 
1. Urban policy options 
 
In almost all post-socialist cities radical reforms of housing and urban policy are seen as a 
necessary step  because of their economic inefficiency and social ineffectiveness. During 
socialism,  the role of urban rent and other market mechanisms in city development were 
deliberately neglected, resulting in destruction of resources for urban development. 
(Caldarevic, 1989). One of the problems is that new policy concepts have  developed in 
an  almost exclusively top-down manner. The political elite is usually open to economic 
globalisation, as internationalisation, westernalisation and Europeanisation are among the 
prime goals of post-socialist transformation. Hence, The new political elites of post-
socialist countries are prone to pressure from international financial institutions to 
implement neo-liberal strategies that favour the fastest possible abandonment of all 
aspects of state socialism, with the least possible role for the state compatible with free 
market and private ownership (Harloe, 1996: 5). Such (urban) policy approach suggests   
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a monolithic ideology  based on the unquestionable superiority of a market-driven world 
in which there exists allegedly only one “correct” type of state-regulating policy - the 
minimalist and residual one (Ferge 1997: 24; Deacon 2000: 112). Also, the winners in the 
first phase of marketisation (who often including  members of the old nomenclature and 
new political elite) use their position to block new fiscal policy and social redistribution 
(Hellman 1998: 233).  
 
In a way, urban and housing policy changes are in line with respective changes in the 
West as they assert a  regulating, rather than a providing,  role of the state. This change in 
the West could be seen as a shift from urban government to urban governance,  
underlying the rise of various actors with the capacity to influence governance, apart 
from  those in political power (Hubbard and Hall 1988: 9). Although informal 
connections between the political and economic elites operate in post-socialist cities, they 
are not as transparent and institutionalised as they should be due to the socialist legacy. 
Also, unlike in the West, such an urban regime has no capacity to reintegrate fragmented 
local civil society even on the elite level (Hubbard and Hall 1988).  The entrepreneurial 
governance strategy generally assumes greater spending on infrastructure development, 
required for attracting capital investment, than for social protection and looks to non-
profit and civil society actors to replace the role of state in providing the social safety net 
within the city.   
 
Bearing in mind the preferred decentralisation of financing and control over collective 
services the entrepreneurial city model involves, post-socialist municipal offices lacked 
sufficient institutional capacity, knowledge and funds for these new approaches to 
complex city governance because they were merely units subordinated to the state 
administration during the socialist era. Also, typically the new political elite at central 
government level is reluctant to allow local government to develop as a powerful political 
entity and, therefore, is reluctant to bestow any substantial financial autonomy on it. 
Additionally, the means of controlling local government become less direct, which results 
in the increasing importance of taxes and obvious tension between the aim of attracting 
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capital investments and need to provide social services. Consequently, the traditional 
spatial/urban policy aim of an ‘equalisation of life conditions’, has been radically 
redefined as a tendency towards ‘desolidarisation’ (Brener 2000: 336). This further 
complicates the role of local government in relation to social citizenship rights, whose 
fulfilment is based on urban and housing services.  
 
Urban governance in post-socialist cities is more reactive to the interest of capital 
investments as well as tolerant of illegal practices than it is strategically proactive, which 
leads to organic rather than comprehensive entrepreneurial city development. Therefore, 
for post-socialist cities, adopting the so-called entrepreneurial city development model  
has high social costs and serious negative effects. In this respect, some post-socialist 
cities resemble Third World cities in which public authorities have abandoned de facto 
control and given up efforts to integrate their population due to social dumping strategies 
and weakening national and local fiscal capacities to provide public goods (Scott et al. 
2002: 23). One of the consequences might be the decreased ability of local populations to  
defend themselves against developers since planning itself has the potential to ‘empower’ 
disenfranchised communities (Ascher 2000). The result is a weak state and/or corruption 
(Woolcock 1998).   
 
In many cases, the political elite’s attitude might be expressed as follows: the best 
urban/housing policy is no policy. The process of political globalisation (primarily 
integration in the EU) still fails to tackle social issues of urban/housing policy 
development (Deacon 2000: 1591). Increased socio-spatial inequalities and respective 
problems are slowly appearing only on the political agenda of urban governments of post-
socialist countries accessing the EU (Simson and Chapman 1999). The EU imposes 
certain social cohesion measures on them as preconditions for the full membership, which 
calls into question the neglected issue of how to define people’s rights to the city and 
housing, contrary to their conceptualization as gifts of the authoritarian socialist state. In 
this respect, it is important to note that although housing privatisation was implemented 
as a recommended strategy from the West to cut (local) government 
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responsibilities/expenditures, it produced more serious negative social effects than 
expected. This is due, on the one hand, to a much larger share of poor families in relation 
to the share of the remaining public rental sector and, on the other, to an insignificant and 
only slowly growing share of other types of rental housing (housing associations, private 
renting) in comparison to the Western countries that served as the model. An increase in 
homelessness is just one of the serious consequences of a policy that has left many 
without affordable housing.  
 
Responsibility to provide urban/housing services is being shifted to families, the 
voluntary or NGO sector and to the market. Considering the weak civil society tradition 
inherited from socialism, this might enhance the role of civil society as a service deliverer 
but not as a political actor (in giving voice to the claims of urban/housing civil 
movements) (Ferge 1997: 27). Generally, there is little research focused on urban and 
housing movements, which are  rare and isolated (Pickvance 1996; Pickvance 2000; Rink 
2000). On the one hand, people are not used to evaluating politicians and lack 
information about their rights, and on the other hand, the political elite is unused to 
considering public opinion, and developing the institutional mechanisms needed to  
reconcile the interests of different social groups. The unwillingness of the post-socialist 
political elite to take into consideration demands of civic groups towards re-defining 
certain social rights (including right to housing, and right to the city) is often justified by 
insufficient financial resources. (Ferge 1997: 27).  
   
Further, post-socialist societies have inherited mistrust in institutions and social re-
structuring. People do not have a clear idea about their social identity and whom they 
must fight. Therefore, post-socialist citizens embrace a partial version of social 
democracy. Whereas in the West, it implies that lower income groups should be given 
priority in improving their living conditions, in post-socialist countries distributive 
concerns are based on the assumption that the state should prevent those already rich 
from becoming  richer (Ferge 1997: 235). Also, post-socialist transformation in Europe 
has taken place in the dual context or cognitive frame of reference, of the West and of the 
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past. (Offe 1996: 231-235). This creates a  danger of betrayed expectations that might 
cause resignation and political passivity. Consequently, the political elite must contend  
with the tension between the promotion of economic stability, on the one hand, and the 
maintenance of political legitimacy in newly democracies, on the other hand. (Offe 1996: 
230). The possible legitimisation crisis (stemming from unfulfilled expectations) has been 
emphasized by researchers dealing with more advanced post-socialist democracies 
(Cooper and Morpeth, 1988). 
 
2. Urban economy change and spatial restructuring  
 
Cities have been the main arenas of post-socialist transformation, reflecting the 
deployment of market mechanisms in real estate allocation as well as housing and land 
privatisation. In comparison to market driven cities, the relatively neglected role of urban 
rent and other market mechanisms during socialism meant less diversity in urban 
services, higher shares of industrial and residential land use, less land use by services and 
offices in the inner city and a lower level of socio-spatial segregation, etc. In other words, 
an urban policy that ignored land value, particularly in central locations, resulted in 
empty spaces in areas that  were extensive used in capitalist cities, even in districts with 
relatively good infrastructure (Tosics 2003).    
 
The introduction of market/rent principles in the use of urban space led to a specific kind 
of a rent gap,  which has attracted new investors particularly foreigners. The rent gap 
refers to a disparity between capitalized ground rent (the actual rent, which depends on 
the site's current intensity and type of land use) and potential ground rent (the rent that 
could be obtained if the site was in the highest and best use). The low utilization of urban 
space, which is the socialist legacy, created  a functional gap as a form of the rent gap, 
particularly in the inner city. (Sykora 1998a) This major functional gap prompted rapid 
replacement of many of the previous functions of the city-centre, whereby office and 
commercial functions crowded out residential function in post-socialist cities (Sykora 
1998b). By contrast, in some cases the recovery of inner cities has been delayed by real 
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estate restitution claims, resulting in an "empty" centre as investors ran away to locations 
on the outskirts. (Keviani et al 2002). 
 
The rent gap approach also points to the inclination of capital to move towards 
suburban/green field locations because the cost of recycling huge areas of previously  
industrial land  exceeds the costs of setting up in green field locations. This primarily 
refers to international retail chains, and office and commercial functions that require a lot 
of space (Timar and Varadi 2001). As a consequence, industrial areas remain derelict, 
like parts of inner cities, creating challenges that cannot be solved simply by market 
mechanisms. The local political elite exacerbates such problems by giving priority to 
infrastructure development of suburban locations and/or by willingness to cooperate with 
investors attracted by the functional gap, a practice labelled as entrepreneurial behaviour 
under the new scheme of revenue mobilisation and retention (Tosics 2003). The interplay 
of the socialist legacy, private capital investments (particularly of FDIs) and policy 
options makes commercial suburbanisation  more advanced than residential development.  
Hence, it differs from Western suburban development.  
 
There is no general trend of de-industrialisation in post-socialist cities but only a shift 
from traditional and ineffective economic sectors towards cleaner and modernized 
industries relocated from developed European/Western countries (Enyedi 1996: 21; Kiss 
2002: 83). Such changes correspond with the peripheral position of post-socialist cities 
within the European urban network. Industry will most probably remain an important 
sector of the urban economy even in Budapest, one of the  most extensively restructured 
of all post-socialist cities. In the next 10 to 15 years it will reveal the effects of being a 
peripheral economy and will remain an industrial center in a semi-peripheral Hungary 
(Barta 1996: 205). The experience of ex-socialist countries in Central Europe proves that 
only large cities can become competitive within European urban hierarchy while smaller 
cities seems doom to reproduce inherited  under-urbanisation. Thus, 80 per cent of FDIs 
in the Central East European region went to Prague, Budapest and Warsaw because these 
cities had the physical conditions necessary for the operation of foreign firms in the 
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region (Keivani et al 2002: 195). By contrast, even the more advanced towns in Hungary 




3. Legacy of informal practices, consumer patterns and city transformation 
 
Informal local practices are stimulated both by the socialist legacy and economic 
globalisation due to rising structural unemployment. 
 
Wallace and Sik (1999) point to  the continued role of open area markets (OAMs) that 
served during socialism as compensators for its production and distribution failures. After 
1989 they became suppliers of goods needed by impoverished social groups. With the 
introduction of capitalism, the OAMs have been regulated and thus transformed from 
sites of illegal activities to ones with a more traditional supplementary role.     
 
Nagy (2001a: 346-347) argues that ‘consumerism’ emerged in a ‘rough’ form in post-
socialist cities not due to the refinement of shopping behaviour and individuation that 
differentiates urban society, but because the locations where people shop have become  
markers of social status, even in the case of goods for daily consumption, which are 
hardly considered to be a status symbol in Western Europe (Nagy 2001:347). The fact 
that the city centre has increasingly become a setting for highly specialized services (for 
example specialist shops), that expanded at the expense of lower order services providing 
for ‘local’ people, has particularly affected the residents of inner city districts as well as 
lower income households in the outer districts, for whom the city centre was the 
traditional focus of daily/weekly shopping. Besides, new hypermarkets are easily reached 
mainly by car and, consequently, are not accessible to low income individuals for whom 
the OAMs remain a prime source of cheap goods. Therefore, society has become strongly 
differentiated in terms of access to shopping facilities and consumer habits.  
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4. New patterns of socio-spatial differentiation 
 
With the new patterns of socio-economic differentiation, more based on income 
inequalities than  was the case during socialism (Weclawowitzs 2002), new patterns of 
socio-spatial polarisation have been unleashed. Households are beginning to be 
concentrated irrespective of their occupants’ place of work, while the housing system has 
been  shaped increasingly by a demand-driven housing market (Kostinskyi 2001). Also, 
new patterns of residential segregation based on ethnicity  are emerging (Ladanyi 2002). 
The present social mix in different neighbourhoods can be seen as a remnant of the 
socialist city that is soon to disappear (Weclawowitzs 1996: 66).   
 
Privatisation has led to the increasing ghettoisation of the public rental sector and/or the 
lower end of the new multi-family condominium sector. Poor families are pushed out by 
indirect and sometimes direct methods from rich neighbourhoods to areas where the 
concentration of the poor increases (Tosics 2003). Middle class families have started to 
leave housing estates with higher concentration of manual workers and signs of  the 
decay of housing stock.  
 
Growing spatial segregation is reflected in significant difference in life expectancy 
between best and worst districts, which has reached six years within Budapest (Tosics 
2003). Budapest has split in two parts: one inhabited by higher social groups in areas that  
look western, other parts inhabited by those who have lost out in the post-socialist  
transition, which tend to resemble areas in the cites of developing country. .  
 
Unlike in the West, the increase in  the suburban population during socialism was not due 
to the relocation of middle class residents from the cities, but the arrival of lower classes 
from  rural areas who were unable to move into the city due to urban and housing policy 
restrictions. In post-socialist cities, massive residential Western type suburbanisation is 
slowly emerging along with the creation of the new middle class. Developments of 
suburban space sometimes serve as the ostentatious ‘showrooms’ of private property. 
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They are in stark contrast to housing estates of low income and less educated indigenous 
inhabitants who were the main actors of suburbanisation during socialism (Sykora 
1998a). The inner  city areas from which the middle class has fled will be occupied soon 
by an underclass (those without a proper job, social security and/or pension during their 
life time) (Tosics 2003).   
 
Also, there is a polarisation between the newly built housing market for those better off 
(including foreigners who create a housing demand for suburban family houses and low 
rise multi-dwelling buildings in attractive inner-city locations) and for those worse–off, 
which  are built in unattractive or less equipped locations, often illegally and/or with low 
construction standards. This poses new challenges for local government to set minimum 
building standards 
 
Divergent or convergent urban patterns and ex-Yugoslav cities  
 
The fragility of new institutions and significant influence of neo-liberal policy has led to 
the creation of so-called “clone cities” (Cooper and Morpeth, 1998: 2264). It has resulted 
in a predominance of a convergent model for reasons of both socialist legacy and post-
socialist policy choices. At the same time, if informal forms of regulations are taken into 
account, it might be concluded that the so-called “wild city” emerged as well, particularly 
in post-socialist countries lagging behind in the process of building new institutions 
(Tosics 2003). Nevertheless, in both cases, the clone and wild city type, post-socialist 
cities are exposed more to organic than regulated development.  
 
Taking into consideration the possibilities of urban governance characterized by 
comprehensive urban/housing policy, Tosics (2003) formulated the following sub-types 
of development of post-socialist cities.   
East German cities, close to the regulated city model due to the influence of 
integration into the capitalist system of the Western part of the country, whose 
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final outcome still depends on the continuing battle between investment lobbies 
and public control; 
 Hungarian and in some respect Slovenian cities, close to the unregulated 
capitalist model due to the huge capital investments and dissolution of the 
previous type of public control, with very slow establishment of its new type;  
Czech, Slovakian, and Polish cities, somewhere between the unregulated and 
regulated capitalist city model regarding some remnants of state control elements 
and very slow establishment of  a new type of public control;  
Bulgarian and Romanian cities, close to an unregulated capitalist city, with some 
elements of Third World development due to limited capital investment, 
dissolution of a previous type of public control and a slow establishment of the 
new one;  
Russian cities, following the investment-led city development model with a 
curious mixture of political and market elements because the dissolution of public 
control has been replaced by political power concentrated at the local level, which 
functions along political and personal lines;   
Albanian cities, close to unregulated Third World city development, with a total 
dissolution of the previous  public control and no new type of regulations, with 
limited capital investment but with the substantial illegal or unofficial commercial 
and housing market.  
 
In order to evaluate the position of ex-Yugoslav cities (except Slovenian) within such a 
typology, it is important to note two facts. First, the Yugoslav policy of socialist self-
management led to the greater importance of market-like relations in the mainstream 
economy, as well as more liberalised income regime and consumption patterns, than in 
other socialist countries. This resulted in a higher standard of living and lower under-
urbanisation in its qualitative terms (investments in infrastructure and resulting functional 
diversity of cities). Second, the phenomenon of blocked transformation during the 1990s 
took place in ex-Yugoslav countries not only due to the war but also because of the 
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behaviour of the new elite, which tended to adapt old institutions, or create new ones in a 
way that enabled them to preserve political power as long as possible.  
 
Considering the issue of urban policy development, very few policy reforms, were 
undertaken. Due to the extent of international isolation, external incentives for economic 
liberalisation were absent. Political elites were not very interested in supporting the role 
of cities in the global economic competition. Also, they opposed political decentralisation 
and supported a continued authoritarian style of governance. Such circumstances allowed 
political actors to be more powerful than the slowly emerging new economic ones as well 
as those in the civil society sector.  
 
In Serbia, the political elite was committed in principle to uphold certain social service 
provisions (keeping some remnants of the socialist regime). In practice, it 
misappropriated scarce resources and responded slowly even to the needs of the most 
vulnerable groups, like refugee households. Within the framework of urban policy, key 
actors of the socialist system, such as central planning agencies, slowly declined in 
importance while the emergence of new actors (market-oriented private developers, non-
profit organisations) was very painful, marginalized and often illegal. One of the key 
transformation issues – enhancing (local) state power to collect taxes was undermined 
both by the black market economy and close connections between the new economic and  
political elite, who were, at the same time, the debtors and the collectors. A similarly 
slow pace of curbing political influence over the economic sphere also characterized 
other ex-Yugoslav countries affected by the war.   
 
With regard to urban economy changes and spatial restructuring, multinational 
companies have been slow to invest in ex-Yugoslav cities due to  political instability 
(Deacon 2000: 158). For the same reasons, even Ljubljana has attracted much less foreign 
direct investments (FDIs) in comparison to Prague, Warsaw, Budapest, in relative terms 
(Pichner-Milanovic, 2001a). Therefore, Western retail chains arrived in much smaller 
numbers and with a considerable delay in ex-Yugoslav cities. Even after political 
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stabilisation took place, foreign investors awaited the creation of institutional 
preconditions and  more solid demand (Tosics 2003). Some limited FDIs have been made 
in city centres, which parallels a widespread practice of subleasing premises of (formerly 
or still) state owned retail outlets, an easy source of profit. At the same time, this practice 
was conducive to financial abuse and corruption. Therefore, city centres have seen a 
growing number of shops and office space but without multinational headquarters, while 
considerable commercial sub-urbanisation has not started yet. 
 
Such development places ex-Yugoslav post-socialist cities in a particularly negative 
position in view of  political and economic globalisation. The fact that cities were 
exposed to war, huge population movements and/or immigration pressures (refugees and 
displaced persons) puts additional pressure on the accessibility of housing, urban services 
and employment. In turn, this makes their competitiveness within European urban 
hierarchy even more difficult. Another problem is that the development of international 
services within the regional sphere of influence can only be expected in one or two big 
cities in the Balkans that are competitive by European standards. It might provoke further 
hostilities within the region and/or further hesitation of investors. The initiation of inter-
city cooperation would be a good solution. However, there is little likelihood of this 
happening, not only because of the recent war, because even the urban governments of 
successful post-socialist cities cooperate primarily with cities/regions of developed 
countries and not among themselves (Tosics 2003, Pichler-Milanovich 2001b). 
 
Economic crisis and blocked institutional transformation fuelled informal practices in 
housing and in the use of the urban space. In the absence of adequate policies to  address  
these problems they became so widespread that one might hesitate to call them illegal. 
Illustrative of this is illegal housing development in Belgrade during the 1990s, which in 
comparison to the socialist period changed in several respects. First, the actors are 
different, as illegal construction was predominantly associated with marginalized social 
groups during socialism, but it is now undertaken by the affluent and powerful as well. 
Namely, members of the political/economic elite participated in illegal housing 
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construction by usurping exclusive and luxury residential locations in Belgrade, such as 
Dedinje which has become one of the main areas of illegal construction. Second, illegal 
housing used to be built on the outskirts of cities, but has become common in the 
metropolitan area and central city locations, as well. Third, the number of illegally built 
flats increased so much that it has equalled the number of newly legally built flats per 
year since the mid 1990s (Petrovic 2001).  
 
Open area markets are another example of the influence of informal/illegal practices on 
urban development, which are much more evident in the Balkan cities than in the Central 
European post-socialist cities. This is due to the higher unemployment rate, lower 
average income and less state power to formalise and legalise OAMs. Local 
governments’ initiatives to relocate the OAMs commonly trigger protests by street 
traders. For the time being, consumption cleavages are more evident concerning the type 
of shops frequented by  different social groups,  not their city location because both 
luxury shops and OAMs are mostly concentrated in the city centres.  
 
Considering socio-spatial differentiation in ex-Yugoslav post-socialist cities, a minority 
of rich people have been increasingly concentrated in luxury low-rise apartment buildings 
in the city centres and/or in individual houses in the pre-socialist elite suburbs that are 
nowadays integrated in the central part of cities. By contrast, a wide layer of the poor is 
still immobile or slowly moving towards the lowest end of the housing market. The 
development of residential Western sub-urbanisation has been very slow because of the 
poor infrastructure and a high residential prestige of the city centre. Besides, ex-
Yugoslav/Balkan cities still lack a middle class. 
 
In spite of the fact that ex-Yugoslav cities are faced with slower socio-spatial 
differentiation due to the slower socio-economic transformation and gradually emerging 
re-stratification patterns, these cities are facing new residential segregation based on 
ethnicity. Cities like Sarajevo, Kosovska Mitrovica and Mostar are now divided cities. 
While ethnic enclaves might have positive attributes in so far as they promote solidarity 
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and supportive networks, equally they have negative implications because they separate 
and inhibit social interactions among citizens of the same city/country. Further, at least in 
Serbia, certain fractions of the poorest refugees or internally displaced persons are 
concentrated in collective centres and/or part of the cities with poor infrastructure. This 
introduces a new dimension of spatial segregation between domicile and immigrant 
population even if they are of the same ethnicity.  
 
Going back to the question of ex-Yugoslav cities’ unique characteristics and/or 
similarities with other post-socialist cities, it could be argued that they differ from 
Romanian and Bulgarian cities, and particularly from Albanian cities, because they have 
a better socialist legacy in terms of city infrastructure and diversities, but resemble them 
in the slow pace of post-socialist restructuring and establishment of new types of public 
control, and respective elements of the Third World development. The danger of 
unfulfilled expectations is particularly evident in the ex-Yugoslav case due to higher 
living standards during socialism compared to other socialist cities. Because of a high 
tolerance of illegal practices, the creation of new regulations in urban development will 
have to solve a more serious de-legitimisation crisis in Central European post-socialist 
cities.  
 
The most likely outcome is that ex-Yugoslav cities will become unregulated capitalist 
cities with more or less evident elements of Third World cities. Nevertheless they will 
differ from the Albanian experience because  huge rural immigration  and consequent 
urban sprawls are unlikely to happen (Hartkoorn 2000). Nevertheless, in all cases with a 
high incidence of informal networking, it seems that even the emergence of NGOs and 
other non-profit associations as providers in housing and urban services might be a step 
ahead in developing civil society. It would force a change of perspective in the definition 
of insiders and outsiders between the people of different social status but not of their 





Concluding comments  
 
The analysed aspects of post-socialist city transformation point on the one hand, to the 
relevance of path dependency and the historical approach, as well as to fruitful results of 
combining different theoretical assumptions within them. On the other hand, they 
highlight the simplistic failures of ecological presumptions. Their socialist heritage has 
left post-socialist cities with few of the conditions needed to develop both their economic 
and political role in global transformation. These cities require certain standards of 
infrastructure in order to attract foreign capital, irrespective of possible advantages 
derived from cheaper labour, rent gaps and/or social dumping strategies. Also, post-
socialist cities need to enhance the capacity of  institutions and other actors, including 
strong civil societies, which  are considered a potential complement to the expansion of 
the global economy and weakening the role of the national state and/or of the creation of 
the supranational institutions (Castells 1994: 32:, McNeill 1999).   
 
A research focus on post-socialist cities would have beneficial policy outcomes by 
helping to enhance their reflexivity as vital social agents and define adequate policy 
measures. In this respect, particularly the research of ex-Yugoslav/Balkan cities should 
pay attention to the simultaneous existence of three institutional patterns: those rooted in 
the previous socialist system, those created by the informal sector and those designed by 
policies consistent with a market driven urban economy. The third pattern  presumably is 
to integrate city and subordinate institutional remnants of socialism and of  informal 
economy (Hegedus and Tosics, 1998: 5).A particular research problem lies in the fact that 
the process of disembedding their socialist city legacy and informal practices is more 
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